NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 8 | Number 3

Article 22

4-1-1930

Taxation -- The Property Basis of Inheritance
Taxation of Intangibles -- Inheritance Tax on Shares
of Non-Resident at Corporate Domicile
Harry Rockwell

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Harry Rockwell, Taxation -- The Property Basis of Inheritance Taxation of Intangibles -- Inheritance Tax on Shares of Non-Resident at
Corporate Domicile, 8 N.C. L. Rev. 319 (1930).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol8/iss3/22

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
rule was first definitely established in Meyers Co. v. Battlel8 which
held that notice of dishonor was necessa Ty notwithstanding a collateral agreement that the indorser would assume the liability of an
"original promisor." A much later case Busbee v. Creech"7 was to
the same effect. By the language tenor of Wrenn v. Lawrence Cotton
Mills it seems that our rule has been extended; namely, so that no
collateral agreement which imposes primary liability on the indorser
will be enforced, whether its tendency is to dispense with the necessity
for the notice of dishonor or to repel the effect of the statute of
limitations. The court's careful consideration of the terms of the
N. I. L. in each of the later cases and the absence of that consideration in the earlier cases indicates the possibility that when the
proper occasion arises, the court may overrule Sykes v. Everett and
declare those parol agreements which limit the indorser's liability
also unenforceable.

J. B. LEwis.
Taxation-The Property Basis of Inheritance Taxation of
Intangibles-Inheritance Tax on Shares of NonResident at Corporate Domicile
The United States Supreme Court has recently decided in the
case of Farmers'Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota,1 that the State
of Minnesota cannot levy an inheritance tax upon the transfer of
bonds issued by that State and by its municipal corporations, owned
and held by a non-resident decedent. Such a radical departure from
the opposite rule as laid down in Blackstone v. Miller,2 affecting as
it does enormous interests, is of itself a landmark in the law of taxation. Its greater interest, however lies in the indication of a trend
in tax principles designed to relieve of the burdens of double taxation, and offering an avenue for a rationalization of the fundamental
conceptions of tax jurisdiction.
- 170 N. C. 168, 86 S. E. 1034 (1915) ; cf. Bank v. Wilson, 168 N. C. 557,
84 S. E. 866 (1915) where the same point was raised but expressly left unsettled.
192 N. C. 499, 135 S. E. 326 (1926) criticised in BIGELOW, BILLS, NoTEs
CHECKS (Lile 3 ed. 1928) §426, n. 7, as follows: "neither the reasoning
nor the result will likely be followed elsewhere." The learned author misinterpreted the facts to mean that the defendant indorsers were accommodating
the plaintiff. See also 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (1923) §§2443-2445; (1924) 38
Hiv. L. REV. 391; BRANNAN, NEGOTiALE INSTRUMENTs LAW (4th ed. 1926)
IT

AND

§§63-64.
'280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930). See Note (1930) 43 H{Av. L. REv.
792; (1930) 64 U. S. L. REy. 158.
2188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. ed. 439 (1902).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
That an inheritance tax is a tax upon the transfer, whether upon
the right to receive or the right to transmit, and not upon the property
itself is well settled.3 But what states have such jurisdiction as will
support the tax has long been in controversy.
Bases of jurisdiction to tax, both property and inheritance, have
heretofore been predicated upon one or more of three factors: (1)
Situs: physical situs of tangibles, 4 and situs of intangibles by reason
of jurisdiction over the owner;8 (2) a user of the laws of a state
necessary to effect the transfer; 6 (3) the protection given to the
debtor and his property at his foreign domicile, which gives the chose
in action its value. 7 The instant case supported by the decisions in
Frick v. Pennsylvania8 and Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v.
Doughton9 inevitably necessitates the conclusion that neither of the
'"Thus the tax is not upon the property in the ordinary sense of the word
but upon the right to dispose of it, and it is not until it has yielded its contribution to the state that it becomes the property of the legatee." United States v.
Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct. 1073, 41 L. ed. 287 (1895) ; In re Morris'
Estate, 138 N. C. 259, 50 S. E. 682 (1905); Washington County Hospital
Ass'n. v. Mealey, 121 Md. 74, 88 Atl. 136, Ann. Cas. 1915B 1050, 48 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 373. So a state may tax a bequest of United States bonds exempt from
a property tax. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 20 Sup. Ct. 829, 44 L. ed.
988 (1899). A majority of the states consider it a tax upon the right to receive. Danna v. Danna, 226 Mass. 297, 115 N. E. 818 (1917) ; GLEASON & OTIs,
INHERITANCE TAXATI N (4th ed. 1925) 256, but the U. S. Supreme Court has
held it to be on the right to transmit. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S.
345, 41 Sup. Ct. 506, 65 L. ed. 620 (1920), in which case the rate of tax is
based upon the entire value of the estate without reference to the specific
beneficiaries.
'Realty may be taxed only in the state where located. Land Title Co. v.
Tax Comm., 131 S. C. 192, 126 S. E. 189, 42 A. L. R. 417 (1925) ; In re Swift,
137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096 (1892). Personalty taxed where located. Coe v.
Erol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475, 29 L. ed. 715 (1886) ; Tobey v. Kipp, 214
Mass. 477, 101 N. E. 988 (1913) ; but cf. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
Ky., 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50 L. ed. 150 (1905), as to property tax, and
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 L. ed. 1058, 42 A. L.
R. 316 (1925), as to inheritance tax.
'State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 21 L. ed. 179 (1872);
Blodgett v. Silverman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410, 72 L. ed. 749 (1927) (also
holding municipal bonds and other specialties to be intangibles). Safe Deposit
and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59 (1929).
' Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 60 L. ed. 830 (1915);
People v. Union Trust Co., 255 Ill. 168, 99 N. E. 377, L. R. A. 1915D 450;
cf. Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 4.
'Blackstone-v. Miller, supra note 2; Bliss v. Bliss, 221 Mass. 201, 109 N. E.
148, L. R. A. 1916A 889; Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32
Sup. Ct. 13, 56 L. ed. 96 (1911). This theory denounced in Beale, Jurisdiction
to Tax (1918) 32 HARv. L. REv. 587; cf. Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts
(1917) 31 HARV. L. REv. 905, 929.
'Supra note 4.
'270 U. S. 69, 46 Sup. Ct. 256, 70 L. ed. 475, 43 A. L. R 1374 (1926), reversing 187 N. C. 263, 121 S. E. 741 (1924).
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last two of these factors govern, but that the controlling requisite
element is territorial jurisdiction of the property taxed. In the first
of the two cases mentioned it was held that tangible personalty may
be taxed only where it is physically located, although its transmission,
by will or intestacy, is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile,10 while, in the second case, North Carolina was denied the right
to levy an inheritance tax on a non-resident's shares in a foreign
corporation although over two thirds of the property of the corporation was located in the state." In the case of State Tax on Foreign
Held Bonds,12 it was decided that a property tax could not be imposed on intangibles owned and held by a non-resident, by the domiciliary state of the debtor, but the Blackstone Case, following this
case by thirty years, permitted an inheritance tax upon such property
upon the conclusion that since this tax was upon the transfer and not
the property, there was a taxing jurisdiction in a state whose laws
must needs be invoked in order for the devisee or distributee to acquire his right to the property, and whose laws gave it the protection
that rendered it valuable. This doctrine, repudiated by a large number of states and avoided by about two thirds of them by reciprocity
agreements, has nevertheless persisted as the supreme law until the
13
decision in the instant case.
So, conceding it as uncontrovertibly settled that the situs of intangibles is at the domicile of the owner,' 4 the case under discussion
decides this: that the jurisdiction necessary to sustain an inheritance
'1 re Coppock, 72 Mont. 431, 234 Pac. 258, 39 A. L. R. 1152 (1925) ;
Chicago Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797, 43 L. ed. 1144
(1898); but cf. Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 4; Blackstone v. Miller
supra note 2; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S.113, 163, 16 Sup. Ct. 139, 40 L. ed. 95
(1895) holding that the laws of decedent's domicile governing descent and distribution of property having foreign situs depend upon their adoption by the
foreign sovereign and not upon any force of their own. Since the domiciliary
state may at will, before the transfer change its laws of distribution, it would
seem that it has the power to alter material rights of the legatees.
"Supra note 9.
2 15 Wall. 300, 21 L. ed. 179 (1872).
"Supra note 10.
The maxim mobilia sequntur personam is generally used to express this
fact. But see Note (1930) 78 U. PA. L. Ray. 532, discussing the Safe Deposit
& Trust Case, supra note 5, where the court says, that the above maxim will not
be applied

" . . .

if to do so would result in inescapable and patent injustice.

• .."However it is submitted that in the case of intangibles, the actual strict
application and not its abrogation will afford the desired relief from double
taxation. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone. No cases have been
found which deny a state the right to tax its residents' intangibles. For the
purpose of attachment and garnishment debts have a situs wherever the debtor
or his property may be found.
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tax upon a given transfer of property is identical with that required
for a property tax, and that the former, in the absence of Federal
exemptions, 15 may not be collected where the latter may not.
Two anomalous situations, however, continue to exist, and to
mar the above theory of escape from double taxation: (1) the "business situs" theory, under which intangibles localized by a constant
use as a stock in trade in a foreign locality are deemed to have a
physical situs there for the purpose of taxation, 16 and (2) the tax,
both property and inheritance, on the shares of a domestic corporation owned and held by a non-resident.' 7 Thie "business situs" theory
will not be discussed here.
In Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank,' 8 the question before
the court was whether the State of Illinois could levy a property tax
on shares in a national bank owned and held by residents of that
state, and collect such tax through the corporation at the place where
the bank was situated and nowhere else. The court speaking through
Mr. Chief Justice Waite decided in the affirmative, but by the following unfortunately ambiguous dictum:
They (shares of national bank stock) are a species of personal
property which is in one sense, intangible and incorporeal, but the
'A tax may be levied upon the succession to property which the state has
no power to subject to direct tax. United States v. Perkins, supra note 3;
Snyder v. Bettman, 190 U. S. 249, 23 Sup. Ct. 803, 47 L. ed. 1035 (1902)
federal securities, Plummer v. Coler, supra note 3; and constitutional provisions
requiring uniformity and equality of assessment have no application. Campbell
v. California, 200 U. S. 87, 26 Sup. Ct. 182, 50 L. ed. 382 (1905) ; see Keeney
v. New York, 222 U. S. 525, 32 Sup. Ct. 105, 56 L. ed. 299 (1911).
"New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 110, 44 L. ed. 174
(1899) ; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. City of Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 38
Sup. Ct. 40, 62 L. ed. 145, L. R. A. 1918C 124; 2 COOLEY, TAXATION, (4th ed.
1924) §§465, 467.
" Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466, 25 Sup. Ct. 297, 49 L. ed. 556 (1904) ;
Hawley v. Madden, 232 U. S. 1, 12, 34 Sup. Ct. 201, 58 L. ed. 477 (1913);
'Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U. S. 285, 293, 30 Sup. Ct. 326, 54 L.
ed. 482 (1909) ; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 18 L. ed. 229 (1865) ;
Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 559, 44 L. ed.
647 (1899) ; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 40 Sup. Ct. 2, 63 L. ed. 1124
(1919); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 81, 82,
supra note 9; Abingdon Bank v. Washington County, 88 Va. 293, 13 S. E. 407
(1891) ; South Nashville St. Ry. Co. v. Morrow, 87 Tenn. 406, 11 S. W. 348, 2
L. R. A. 853 (1889). The right to levy such tax was denied in N. C. v. Ry.
Comm'rs., 91 N. C. 454 (1884), but under the Laws of 1893, ch. 296, §14 appropriate legislation was enacted and the tax adopted. Willey v. Comm'rs., 111
N. C. 397, 16 S. E. 542 (1892) ; Brown v. Jackson, 179 N. C. 366, 369, 102
S. E. 739 (1920).
19 Wall. 490, 503, 22 L. ed. 189, 195 (1873), citing Van Allen v. Assessors,
supra note 17, and construing the National Currency Act of Feb. 25, 1863, 12
Stat. at Large 668.
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law which creates them may separate them from the person of their

owner for the purpose of taxation and give them a situs of their own.
That language cited with approval in a following line of cases, deal-

ing with both a tax directly upon the shares and upon the transfer
thereof by a deceased owner, gave rise to a rule, now firmly imbedded, that a state chartering a corporation could by a provision in

its charter or by general legislative enactment fix the situs of its
shares in that state, and consequently lay both property and inheritance taxes upon such property and its transfer.19 After the decision
in State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds a property tax on choses in
action, except corporate shares, was no longer valid but the right to
levy an inheritance tax under the theory as advanced in the Blackstone Case was not denied. 20
Three arguments have from time to time been offered to sustain
both property and inheritance taxes on the corporate shares of nonresidents, namely: (1) that a state in granting a right which it might
at will withhold, may impose any condition it sees fit upon the exercise of the franchise granted, (2) that a share of stock is more than
an ordinary chose in action and represents an interest in the property
and franchises of the corporation which are located within the state,
(3) the fact that the law of the incorporating state gives value to the
chose in action through its protection of the debtor and his property,
and the offer of access to its courts, as announced in the Blackstone
Case. As to the first, it is settled beyond doubt that a State may
21
annex no unconstitutional conditions to the grant of a franchise.
"It is believed that this tax originated as follows: Few states imposed
inheritance taxes until 1885 when New York passed its law, although Pennsylvania adopted one in 1826. See 26 R. C. L. 165. By this time the dictum of
Mr. Chief Justice Waite on the Tappan case had become a deeply rooted
precedent. In 1891, in Abingdon Bank v. Washington County, supra note 17,
Fauntleroy, J. said, "If a state may do this (tax non-residents' national bank
shares) as to stock and stockholders created by the Congress of the United
States, a fortiori,it may legislate to authorize a county to levy a tax for county
purposes upon the shares of a bank located within the county." It was apparently not considered that the right to tax the national bank shares was
derivative from a sovereign who had nation wide jurisdiction and who could
delegate such right and regulate its exercise as it saw fit. See Note (1903)
58 L. R. A. 513, at 580-581. Also in the Tappan case the tax reviewed was one
levied by a county of the state upon the shares held by all the residetts of the
state, and the question as to non-residents was not in issue. The case could
have been correctly decided upon the proposition that a state had the power to
regulate the collection of taxes levied upon its citizens. The tax in question
was a property tax, and upon such precedent was the present tax nourished.
' Supra note 7.

'See HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AuERIcAx
CoNsTiTUTioNAL LAW (1918) 132 et seq.
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Thus, providing that property which under existing rules is located
clearly without the territorial limits of the sovereign shall have a
taxable situs within the state is patently unconstitutional. Situs is
a fact, determinable at a given time by existing physical circumstances,
and is not subject to removal from place to place at the will of a
legislature. 22 The Rhode Island Hospital Trust Case affirming the
view taken in a long line of prior decisions disposes of the second
-contention, which appears absurd when it is considered that often,
part or all of the property of the domestic corporation is located in a
foreign state. And when a corporation is incorporated in three or
four states it logically follows and has been held that each state has
the right to tax upon the full value of the shares regardless of the
location of its property. 23 The practise is to apportion the amount
of the tax in each state according to the value of the property situated
there; though difficulty in logic occurs when intangibles are to be
apportioned and when tangibles are located in jurisdictions foreign to
the taxing states. This is a matter of comity between the states
24
however, and not of law.
It is submitted that the third argument above has exerted the
greatest influence toward sustaining the tax on corporate shares, to
which it must be confessed, it is even more applicable than the case
of other evidences of indebtedness, and that the first two contentions
are subordinate to it and apparently groundless. Logically then, the
inheritance tax on non-residents' domestic corporate shares would
seem to fall with the tax in the Farmers' Loan and Trust Case.
To so hold, however, will not mean that the incorporating state
can levy no tax on such shares. There still exists a true basis for
taxation, upon which apparently through misconception the inheritance tax was predicated. 25 The "right to be a corporation "as distinguished from the "right to do business" is a franchise granted by
the sovereign to the stockholders 26 upon which an excise tax may
"There is no more reason in holding unconstitutional a provision by the
incorporating state declaring that the situs of bonds, issued by the domestic
corporation and held by a non-resident stockholder, shall be in the state.
"Knowlton v. Moore 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. ed. 969 (1899);
Northern Cent. Ry. Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 152 Md. 94, 136 At. 66, 60 A. L.

R. 558 (1927).
"Welch v. Treasurer, 223 Mass. 87, 111 N. E. 774 (1916) ; cf. Kingsbury
v. Chapin, 196 Mass. 533, 82 N. E. 700, 13 Ann. Cas. 738 (1907).
"Supra note 19.
"Fiestam v. Hay, 122 Ill. 293, 13 N. E. 501, 3 Am. St. 492 (1887) ; Memphis
Ry. Co. v. Ry. Commr's., 112 U. S. 609, 5 Sup. Ct. 299, 28 L. ed. 837 (1884) ;
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be levied. 27 For such tax there need be no property within the jurisdiction of the state. There ig no conflict under this type of tax, with
the Rhode Island Hospital Case since there the franchise was "the
right to do business," granted to the corporate entity and not the
stockholders.
It is desirable that the domestic inheritance tax on foreign held
shares be declared invalid. Reciprocity arrangements among the
great majority of the states have reduced the revenue thus derived
to a mere pittance. 28 The only effect this tax seems to have is to
hamper the administration of decedents' estates consisting partly of
corporate stock and to increase the tendency to conceal intangible
29
assets.
HARRY ROCKWELL.

Wills-Construction-Words of Limitation
The residuary clause of a will gave the testator's wife the residue
of the property "to be used by her so long as she lives and enjoys
the same." Held: that the widow gets fee title.1
The absence of words of inheritance is not fatal to the creation,
by will, of an estate in fee,2 although, at common law, a general
devise without words of limitation carried only a life estate.8 As a
general rule, a devise of the residue of an estate is presumed to pass
4 T opso,

Coo0RAToNs, (3d ed. 1927)

§§2919-2920;

but cf.

Bank of Cali-

fornia v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 Pac. 832, 64 L. R. A. 918 (1904).
'What is meant here is an annual tax upon the franchise, not upon the
theory that the franchise is property within the state, but in the nature of a
license tax upon the privilege of being a corporation within the taxing state.
Such a tax is analogous to one levied upon a non-resident for a license to drive
an automobile upon the highways of the taxing state.
'In 1928, twenty-two states levied inheritance taxes upon intangibles of
non-residents. Florida, Alabama, District of Columbia, and Nevada have no
inheritance tax laws. Eight states allow absolute exemption to such property.
Twelve states belong to reciprocity groups, while Idaho, New Mexico, Nebraska, and Wyoming do not generally exercise their right to tax property of

this type. See report of the Tax Commission of North Carolina (1928)

at

page 521.

' See Report of the Tax Commission of North Carolina (1928) pages 505-6
where instances of delay in administration of estates, causing shrinkage in
values of property are cited.
'Pfeifer v. Wright, 34 F. (2nd) 690 (N. D. Okla. 1929).
'In re Kidd's Estate, 293 Pa. 21, 141 Atl. 644 (1928).
1 TIrFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1920) 76. But see the interesting case
of Willcut v. Calinan, 98 Mass. 75 (1867) (a devise of a tomb and other real
property was held to be in fee in spite of the absence of words of inheritance,
the court reasoning that the testator did not intend for the devisee to take a
mere life estate in a burial place.

